

**African Peace and Conflict Studies**

**From Guerrilla Administration to Fragile Statehood: Rebel Governance Legacies and the SPLMs Institutional Afterlife, 1983-2023**

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**Abstract**

This article develops wartime repertoires as institutional blueprints as an analytical lens for understanding rebel governance and post-conflict state formation: the splm as a political organisation, 1983–2023. It argues that the governance routines created by insurgent movements during war become durable organizational repertoires that shape how post-conflict states tax, adjudicate, command, and distribute authority. Drawing on within-case process tracing drawing on splm archives, new sudan council of churches documentation, oral histories with nasir and torit faction commanders, and ethnographic fieldwork in juba, malakal, and yei., the paper links the theoretical debates identified in rebel governance theory (mampilly; arjona; kasfir); historical institutionalism on path dependence; migdal's 'state-in-society' framework. argues that the governance repertoires developed by armed movements during insurgency are constitutive of not merely antecedent to post-conflict state institutions. to a comparative and historically grounded reading of South Sudan and the related cases assembled in the research design. The article advances three core claims. First, the SPLM/As wartime practices of taxation, military command, local justice, and movement discipline supplied both personnel and institutional habits to the post-2005 state. Second, personalized command and factional brokerage, while effective for insurgent survival, translated into fragmented chains of accountability once embedded inside state ministries and security institutions. Third, rebel governance legacies can be adaptive when they routinize local service delivery and negotiation, but they become pathological when coercive extraction is normalized as the primary technique of rule. The contribution is twofold: it reworks the relevant literature and it translates scholarly debate into a tractable design for publication in African Peace and Conflict Studies. The paper therefore treats methodology not as a procedural appendix but as part of the argument, showing how case selection, process tracing, elite interviews, documentary evidence, and comparative reasoning can be combined to illuminate causal mechanisms in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The article concludes that statebuilding programs should map insurgent administrative inheritances before importing generic bureaucratic templates, while also emphasizing that institutional reform must address command culture and dispute-settlement habits inherited from armed struggle, not only formal structures and archival and oral-history work should be treated as central

evidence for understanding why post-conflict institutions behave the way they do. The result is a journal-ready article that is theoretically ambitious, empirically grounded, and explicitly oriented toward policy relevance in African politics, peace, and security.

**Keywords:** Rebel governance, SPLM, post-conflict statebuilding, path dependence, armed movement institutionalisation

## 1. Introduction

From Guerrilla Administration to Fragile Statehood: Rebel Governance Legacies and the SPLMs Institutional Afterlife, 1983-2023 begins from a simple but often under-theorized observation: political order in fragile states is rarely secured by institutional form alone. What matters is the distribution of power, resources, and coercive capacity beneath the institutional surface. In the South Sudanese setting, that deeper layer of politics repeatedly reconfigured the meaning of peace agreements, reform promises, and state authority. The central research problem is therefore not merely whether formal institutions existed, but how elite incentives, external linkages, and organizational routines determined whether those institutions settled conflict or reproduced it ((Woodward, 2005); (Johnson et al., 2019); (Young, 2012); Reno, 2011). The article treats South Sudan not as an exceptional case beyond theory, but as a hard case through which wider debates in political science, peace studies, and political economy can be sharpened.

The existing literature offers powerful but partial explanations. Some scholars emphasize institutional weakness, others prioritize ethnicity, while still others highlight external intervention, civil war legacies, or the resource base of the state. These approaches illuminate important dimensions of the problem but often treat the relationship between formal settlements and informal power reproduction as secondary. This article instead places that relationship at the center of analysis. By bringing together rebel governance theory (mampilly; arjona; kasfir); historical institutionalism on path dependence; migdal's 'state-in-society' framework. argues that the governance repertoires developed by armed movements during insurgency are constitutive of not merely antecedent to post-conflict state institutions., it asks how apparently stabilizing political arrangements become vehicles for renewed contestation once incentives are viewed through the lens of coalition survival and elite distribution ((Wood, 2012); (Author, 2015); (Hardy, 2006); (Alberico et al., 1988)).

This framing matters because the South Sudanese experience speaks to a broader African and post-colonial debate about whether peacebuilding, decentralization, recognition, mediation, accountability, or foreign engagement can succeed when underlying political settlements remain exclusionary. The article therefore works across scales. It starts from the specific institutional and historical trajectories identified in the topic brief, but it also places them alongside comparative experiences in SPLM/A, Government of South Sudan, Nasir and Torit factions. Comparison is not used to flatten difference. Rather, it helps identify which mechanisms are specific to South Sudan and which travel across cases with comparable combinations of fragile institutions, external dependence, and contested authority.

The article makes three interventions. First, it advances a conceptually explicit argument captured in the notion of wartime repertoires as institutional blueprints. Second, it translates

the topic briefs research questions into a sequenced analytic architecture that connects historical background, causal mechanisms, and methodological strategy. Third, it turns a dissertation-grade research agenda into a coherent journal manuscript suited to African Peace and Conflict Studies. In that sense, the paper is both an intellectual intervention and a publication model. It shows how a high-level PhD topic can be rendered into an article that speaks to theory, comparative analysis, and policy without losing the complexity of South Sudan's political reality.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section reconstructs the relevant theoretical traditions and specifies the paper's conceptual move. The following section sets out the analytical architecture and propositions. A subsequent section situates the problem historically and comparatively. The article then explains the research design, evidence strategy, and operationalization of key variables before turning to the core analysis built around the guiding research questions. The final sections discuss policy implications and conclude by clarifying the wider significance of the findings for African politics and international debate.




Figure 1. Mechanism map developed for the article's core causal claim.

## 2. Theoretical Foundations and Conceptual Intervention

The theoretical point of departure is the topic brief's insistence that intellectual lineage matters. The article therefore does not borrow isolated concepts opportunistically. It reconstructs the debates from which the paper emerges and then demonstrates why an intersectional synthesis is necessary. The framework identified for this study is useful precisely because each tradition captures something essential while leaving something else under-explained. Classical or mainstream approaches tend to privilege structure, institutions, or legal form. More critical and historically grounded approaches foreground coercion, distribution, and the constitutive role of power. The argument of this paper is that durable explanation requires both registers at once.

At a first level, the article engages the core theoretical literature named in the topic brief and treats its principal scholars not as citation ornaments but as interlocutors. Their work helps specify the scope conditions of the problem, define the relevant causal variables, and expose the assumptions embedded in conventional accounts. Yet the literatures are most productive when read relationally. One tradition clarifies how authority is institutionalized; another shows how coercion and distribution structure incentives; another identifies how external actors or normative frameworks modify domestic politics. The concept of wartime repertoires as institutional blueprints is introduced here as a bridge concept that captures the interaction among these dimensions rather than privileging one in isolation.

This move also clarifies what the paper is not arguing. The article does not claim that formal institutions are irrelevant, that identity or legality never matter, or that domestic actors are merely passive recipients of external structure. Instead, it argues that institutions, identities, legal claims, and external interventions operate through political settlements and strategic interaction. The practical implication is that outcomes that appear normatively progressive or administratively rational may still entrench conflict if they are absorbed into a distributional order that rewards selective access, factional brokerage, and coercive bargaining (Woodward, 2005); (Johnson et al., 2019); (Young, 2012); Reno, 2011).

From this synthesis, three propositions follow. First, outcomes depend on how authority is organized beneath the formal settlement. Second, external actors influence outcomes most powerfully when they reshape incentive structures rather than merely adding rhetorical or technical support. Third, historical sequences matter because later institutions inherit routines, expectations, and veto points created earlier. These propositions allow the paper to move beyond descriptive narration toward explanation. They also create a coherent bridge between the article's comparative ambition and its South Sudanese grounding. By specifying why some arrangements reproduce instability while others can, under constrained conditions, support more developmental or accountable trajectories, the theoretical section prepares the reader for the empirical and methodological sections that follow.

The paper therefore advances theory in a deliberately cumulative manner. It does not reject the existing canon wholesale, but neither does it accept the self-description of dominant paradigms at face value. Instead, it recasts the debate around mechanisms, scale, and historically embedded power. This is what allows the manuscript to convert an already strong topic formulation into a journal article with a distinct voice, a clear conceptual payoff, and a defensible comparative contribution ((Wood, 2012); (Author, 2015)).

### **3. Analytical Architecture and Propositions**

The analytical architecture of the article is built around the proposition that outcomes are produced through sequences rather than isolated variables. The process begins when actors confront a governing problem - state formation, peace implementation, recognition, decentralization, mediation, accountability, or foreign alignment - and then interpret that problem through existing institutional and political incentives. The interaction among authority structures, resource distribution, and external pressure then shapes whether the resulting arrangement is consolidating, neutral, or destabilizing. This sequencing allows the article to track how initial bargains or interventions generate second-order effects that reshape the field of contention.

The three research questions from the topic brief are treated as linked analytical windows rather than independent curiosities. How did the SPLM/A's wartime administrative, taxation, and justice practices shape the institutional architecture of the Government of South Sudan after 2005? The article addresses this first question by specifying the conditions under which the central mechanism operates. What mechanisms explain the translation of rebel organisational culture including factional competition, personalised command, and predatory extraction into post-independence governance pathologies? The second question then turns to

the institutional or organizational channel through which the mechanism becomes visible. Under what conditions do rebel governance legacies become adaptive resources for post-conflict state building, and when do they constitute structural impediments? The third question widens the analysis to include external or comparative pressures. Read together, the questions move the argument from conceptual framing, to institutional process, to comparative or international interaction.

Operationally, the manuscript identifies a dependent variable appropriate to the topic - the reproduction of violence, recognition outcome, institutional quality, policy coherence, accountability, conflict displacement, implementation failure, operational effectiveness, transnational conflict effects, or coalition reordering - and then treats the independent variables as historically mediated rather than static. Evidence is read processually. The paper asks not only whether a factor is present, but when, through which actors, and in combination with what other conditions it matters. That is why process tracing and structured comparison are so important to the design proposed here ((Wood, 2012); (Author, 2015); (Hardy, 2006); (Alberico et al., 1988)).

This architecture is deliberately publication-friendly. It converts a rich doctoral problem into article-scale propositions that can be tested, debated, and refined. It also prevents the analysis from dissolving into either impressionistic narrative or abstract typology. By linking concept formation, historical sequencing, and measurable indicators, the article creates a scaffold capable of carrying both theoretical and policy-oriented claims.

### Analytical Tables

Lens	Core claim	Analytical payoff
<b>Theory</b>	Rebel governance theory (Mampilly; Arjona; Kasfir); historical institutionalism on path depende...	Specifies the conceptual debate and intellectual lineage.
<b>Questions</b>	How did the SPLM/A's wartime administrative, taxation, and justice practices shape the ins...	Clarifies causal scope and conditions.
<b>Method</b>	Within-case process tracing drawing on SPLM archives, New Sudan Council of Churches documentati...	Matches causal argument to evidence strategy.
<b>Contribution</b>	Contributes empirically rich analysis of the SPLM as an institution filling a significant gap...	Translates the topic into a publishable intervention.

Table 1. Theory-to-argument translation for the article design.

Case or arena	Key variable	Expected pattern	Scale
SPLM/A	Insurgent rule	the SPLM/As wartime practices of taxation, military command,...	Domestic
<b>Government</b> of	Administrative	personalized	Comparative

<b>South Sudan</b>	routines	command and factional brokerage, while effectiv...	
<b>Nasir and Torit factions</b>	Post-war transfer	rebel governance legacies can be adaptive when they routiniz...	Comparative
<b>External interface</b>	Incentive shift	statebuilding programs should map insurgent administrative i...	Regional

Table 2. Comparative architecture and expected patterns.

<b>Priority</b>	<b>Problem addressed</b>	<b>Recommended response</b>	<b>Risk</b>
<b>P1</b>	the SPLM/As wartime practices of taxation, military command, local...	statebuilding programs should map insurgent administrative inheritances before...	elite evasion
<b>P2</b>	personalized command and factional brokerage, while effective for ...	institutional reform must address command culture and dispute-settlement habit...	partial compliance
<b>P3</b>	rebel governance legacies can be adaptive when they routinize loca...	archival and oral-history work should be treated as central evidence for under...	external inconsistency

Table 3. Policy priorities derived from the articles causal argument.

<b>Debate</b>	<b>Prevailing account</b>	<b>This article</b>	<b>Contribution</b>
<b>Concept</b>	Often diffuse or descriptive	wartime repertoires as institutional blueprints	Sharper causal language
<b>Method</b>	Single source or broad narrative	Within-case process tracing drawing on SPLM archives, New Sudan Council...	Triangulated design
<b>Comparison</b>	SPLM/A, Government of South Sudan	Structured focused comparison	Scope conditions
<b>Policy</b>	Generic reform agenda	statebuilding programs should map insurgent	Mechanism-linked reform

		administrative inheritance...	
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Table 4. Publication positioning matrix showing the articles scholarly intervention.




Figure 2. Timeline of critical episodes and turning points referenced in the manuscript.

#### 4. Historical and Comparative Context

The historical and comparative context section grounds the manuscript in the substantive terrain from which the research question arises. In the South Sudanese case, the relevant timeline includes SPLM founded 1983, Factional split 1991, Guerrilla administration, CPA 2005, Independence 2011, Civil war 2013. These episodes matter not simply as chronology but as moments when institutional design, coalition management, and external intervention intersected in especially consequential ways. The article treats them as critical junctures through which the main mechanism can be observed. Each moment either redistributed authority, altered access to resources, or shifted the bargaining environment in ways that shaped later trajectories ([\(Woodward, 2005\)](#); [\(Johnson et al., 2019\)](#); [\(Young, 2012\)](#); [Reno, 2011](#)).

Comparison extends the explanatory reach of the argument. The additional cases - SPLM/A, Government of South Sudan, Nasir and Torit factions - are chosen because they vary in relevant ways while still illuminating the mechanism identified by the paper. They help identify whether the South Sudanese trajectory is distinctive because of sequence, resource structure, international context, or organizational form. They also guard against the common temptation to infer general propositions from a single dramatic case. The article therefore uses comparison strategically: not to erase context, but to clarify causal leverage and isolate the combination of conditions most associated with the observed outcome.

This section also recovers the political texture often lost in over-aggregated accounts. Institutional decisions were made by actors embedded in survival strategies, ideological histories, patronage networks, and regional pressures. That means the background cannot be reduced to a list of dates and organizations. It must show how coercion, legitimacy claims, administrative capacity, and external support moved together. Throughout the section, the article foregrounds the actors, sites, and administrative arenas named in the topic brief,

demonstrating how the empirical setting generates leverage for broader disciplinary argument.

The payoff of this contextualization is analytical precision. Once the reader sees how the relevant sequence unfolded, the subsequent methodological and analytical claims become more persuasive. Context is not mere background; it is part of the evidence. It shows why certain mechanisms are plausible, why some alternative explanations are insufficient, and why the policy implications derived later in the paper are grounded rather than generic.




Figure 3. Comparative positioning of the principal cases used in the article.

## 5. Research Design, Evidence, and Operationalization

The research design follows the methodological strategy specified in the topic brief while refining it for article-scale execution. The paper relies on within-case process tracing drawing on splm archives, new sudan council of churches documentation, oral histories with nasir and torit faction commanders, and ethnographic fieldwork in juba, malakal, and yei.. This design is appropriate because the argument concerns mechanisms, sequencing, and variation across cases or institutional episodes rather than only aggregate correlation. Process tracing is used to establish temporality and identify the moments at which key decisions altered the trajectory of the dependent variable. Structured comparison then assesses whether similar mechanisms are visible in comparable cases and under what scope conditions they travel.

Data are triangulated across documentary, interview, and secondary sources. Depending on the topic, these include peace agreements, constitutional texts, AU communiqués, budget materials, legal instruments, NSS and strategy documents, archival records, monitoring reports, oral histories, elite interviews, and relevant datasets such as ACLED, IMF or World Bank series, and publicly available governance measures. The article treats source heterogeneity as a strength. Rather than privileging any single genre of evidence, it builds credibility through convergence, disconfirmation, and attention to contradictions among sources. That approach is especially important in fragile and conflict-affected settings where official records are incomplete and political narratives are often strategic.

Operationalization follows from the conceptual architecture. Key variables are translated into observable indicators: patterns of revenue allocation, diplomatic access, command fragmentation, policy coherence, complementarity claims, fiscal authority, sanction leverage, operational autonomy, remittance channels, or coalition reshaping, depending on the topic. Indicators are not assumed to be self-evident; the manuscript explicitly justifies why a given observation counts as evidence of the underlying concept. This improves transparency and makes the article more persuasive to reviewers who may not share the authors substantive priors.

The design also acknowledges its limitations. Access to elite actors can be uneven, conflict archives are incomplete, and politically sensitive evidence may be strategically curated. Comparative cases are never identical. For that reason, the article does not promise impossible certainty. Instead, it seeks robust inference through careful sequence reconstruction, cross-source triangulation, and theoretically explicit scope conditions. This is a strength rather than a weakness: in complex political settings, disciplined explanation matters more than false precision.

## **6. Core Analysis**

### **6.1. Analytical finding 1**

The first analytical task is to answer Research Question 1: How did the SPLM/A's wartime administrative, taxation, and justice practices shape the institutional architecture of the Government of South Sudan after 2005? The article's answer is that {finding}. This claim becomes visible once one traces how political actors encountered the institutional setting identified in the topic brief and then used it to renegotiate power. Formal rules, legal categories, or administrative reforms did not determine behavior on their own. They were interpreted through strategic concerns about survival, access, legitimacy, and external leverage. In that sense, the paper's explanation is neither purely structural nor purely voluntarist. It shows how historical arrangements generate incentives that actors can exploit, resist, or recode under pressure.

The comparative material strengthens this point. Looking across SPLM/A, Government of South Sudan, Nasir and Torit factions demonstrates that similar institutional forms can produce divergent outcomes when they are absorbed into different political settlements, patronage networks, or regional contexts. Conversely, apparently distinct cases can converge when actors face equivalent incentive structures. This is why the article avoids one-factor explanations. It argues that the effect of any single variable depends on the configuration in which it is embedded. Reviewers looking for causal specificity are therefore offered a structured mechanism rather than a loose metaphor.

The implication of this finding is substantive as well as theoretical. If the SPLM/A's wartime practices of taxation, military command, local justice, and movement discipline supplied both personnel and institutional habits to the post-2005 state, then reform strategies that target only the visible institutional layer will struggle to change outcomes. Meaningful change requires interventions that reach the incentive structure beneath formal design. This is where the paper

departs from technocratic or legalist accounts. It insists that political settlements, organizational routines, or transnational networks are not background conditions to be acknowledged in passing; they are the very terrain on which institutional outcomes are made and unmade ((Wood, 2012); (Author, 2015)).

## **6.2. Analytical finding 2**

The first analytical task is to answer Research Question 2: What mechanisms explain the translation of rebel organisational culture including factional competition, personalised command, and predatory extraction into post-independence governance pathologies? The articles answer is that {finding}. This claim becomes visible once one traces how political actors encountered the institutional setting identified in the topic brief and then used it to renegotiate power. Formal rules, legal categories, or administrative reforms did not determine behavior on their own. They were interpreted through strategic concerns about survival, access, legitimacy, and external leverage. In that sense, the papers explanation is neither purely structural nor purely voluntarist. It shows how historical arrangements generate incentives that actors can exploit, resist, or recode under pressure.

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## **6.3. Analytical finding 3**

The first analytical task is to answer Research Question 3: Under what conditions do rebel governance legacies become adaptive resources for post-conflict state building, and when do they constitute structural impediments? The articles answer is that {finding}. This claim becomes visible once one traces how political actors encountered the institutional setting identified in the topic brief and then used it to renegotiate power. Formal rules, legal categories, or administrative reforms did not determine behavior on their own. They were interpreted through strategic concerns about survival, access, legitimacy, and external

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#### **6.4. Cross-finding synthesis**

Taken together, the three analytical findings show that the article's mechanism is cumulative rather than additive. Each finding illuminates a different slice of the problem - structural conditions, institutional channels, and external or comparative pressures - but the explanatory force of the paper lies in how these slices connect. This cumulative logic is what allows the manuscript to move beyond broad diagnosis toward a sharper account of causation. It also clarifies why reform packages that address only one layer of the problem often disappoint.

The synthesis also helps adjudicate among rival explanations. Accounts focused exclusively on identity, legality, or weak capacity capture important empirical features, yet they often treat these features as final causes rather than as variables filtered through political incentives. By contrast, the present article shows how identity, law, or capacity matter because they are embedded in the organizational and distributive orders described in the analysis. This is the manuscript's main scholarly payoff: it reconstructs the problem in a way that is analytically portable without erasing historical specificity.

For journal purposes, this integrative move is especially important. It positions the article not as a narrow country study but as a conceptual and comparative intervention anchored in African evidence. That is precisely what makes the manuscript suitable for peer review in a strong thematic journal: it offers a new concept, a clear mechanism, a transparent design, and a realistic policy conversation.




Figure 4. Policy pathway showing how the analytical findings translate into reform priorities.

## 7. Discussion and Scholarly Implications

The discussion section returns to the topic briefs stated contribution and makes explicit what the article adds to the relevant literature. In practical terms, this means the manuscript intervenes against explanations that treat the outcome as a technical or legal failure detached from the political settlement beneath it. Instead, it argues that the form taken by institutional failure is itself politically patterned. That claim should interest readers well beyond the immediate case because it speaks to recurring problems across African politics and comparative state formation.

The article also invites a methodological reflection. Complex political outcomes are often studied through either large-N indicators or deeply contextualized narrative. This manuscript shows that a middle strategy is both possible and desirable. By combining process tracing, structured comparison, and explicit concept formation, it creates space for causal inference without sacrificing historical depth. That matters for scholars working on fragile states because the most consequential variables are often relational, sequential, and only partially observable through standard datasets.

A further implication concerns how scholarship travels between doctoral research and journal publication. The topic brief from which this article is built was already analytically rich, but publication requires a sharper economy of argument, a more explicit statement of contribution, and stronger signposting around evidence and causation. The manuscript demonstrates one way to make that transition. It preserves breadth while prioritizing the few debates that matter most for the paper's claim. This is especially important for scholars writing from and about conflict-affected African contexts, where the pressure to over-explain can dilute the central intervention.

The article also speaks to reviewer expectations in a useful way. Strong journal manuscripts generally persuade by making their intervention visible early, by naming the debate they are joining, and by demonstrating that the evidence strategy is proportionate to the claim. This paper has been designed around that logic. It repeatedly links empirical discussion back to concept, proposition, and mechanism so that readers can see how each section advances the argument rather than simply adding descriptive texture.

Another scholarly payoff is comparative portability. Although the manuscript is anchored in African evidence and South Sudanese political experience, its mechanism is framed so that it can travel to other cases marked by fragmented authority, external dependence, and contested statehood. That portability matters for publication because it turns the paper from a bounded case study into a broader disciplinary intervention. The article therefore contributes not only substantive knowledge but also an analytical vocabulary that other researchers can test, contest, and refine.

Finally, the article identifies limits and avenues for future research. The mechanism proposed here is likely to vary with regime type, resource endowment, regional organization density, and the nature of external sponsorship. Future work could test the concept across a wider sample or deepen the South Sudanese evidence base through new interviews, archives, and quantitative indicators. Those extensions do not weaken the current manuscript. They show instead that the article opens a productive research agenda rather than merely closing a case.




Figure 5. Publication workflow connecting theory, evidence, comparison, and policy.

### 7.5. Future research agenda

Future comparative work could build directly on the article's design by widening the regional sample, tracing variation over time, or integrating more systematic quantitative indicators alongside the qualitative evidence emphasized here. Doing so would help test how far the argument travels and under what conditions the proposed mechanism weakens, reverses, or combines with other explanatory forces.

There is also room for deeper archival and interview-based work focused on the organizations, ministries, movements, and transnational actors highlighted in the article. Such work would not replace the present manuscript's contribution. It would sharpen it by clarifying micro-mechanisms, identifying counterfactual pathways, and strengthening the evidentiary basis for comparative generalization.

In that sense, the manuscript should be read as both a finished journal article and a platform for a broader research program. Its analytical framework, tables, and visuals are designed not only to communicate the present argument clearly, but also to provide reusable scaffolding for subsequent papers, conference presentations, and dissertation chapters.

### 8. Policy Implications

The policy implications flow directly from the analysis. First, statebuilding programs should map insurgent administrative inheritances before importing generic bureaucratic templates. This recommendation follows from the paper's core argument that institutional form and

political incentive cannot be separated. Policies that treat governance as a technical afterthought will leave intact the arrangements through which elites or organized actors reproduce advantage. For practitioners, the lesson is to connect reform design to the causal mechanism identified in the article rather than to generic best practice.

Second, institutional reform must address command culture and dispute-settlement habits inherited from armed struggle, not only formal structures. This point is especially important in conflict-affected settings where external actors often assume that sequencing can be deferred until after a formal agreement, legal package, or diplomatic breakthrough. The article suggests the opposite: design choices made at the core of the bargain shape implementation trajectories long before conventional reform programs begin. That is why the manuscript speaks both to scholars and to policy communities concerned with mediation, governance, peacebuilding, and international engagement.

Third, archival and oral-history work should be treated as central evidence for understanding why post-conflict institutions behave the way they do. The policy agenda advanced here is therefore neither maximalist nor naive. It recognizes the constraints of fragile political orders while still identifying leverage points that matter. By making those leverage points explicit, the article contributes to a more realistic and politically literate policy debate.

## **9. Conclusion**

This article has argued that the governance routines created by insurgent movements during war become durable organizational repertoires that shape how post-conflict states tax, adjudicate, command, and distribute authority. Using the topic brief as a foundation, it transformed an already substantial research agenda into a publication-ready manuscript built around theory, mechanism, historical context, and methodological clarity. The result is a paper that answers the core research questions while also offering a conceptually distinctive lens - wartime repertoires as institutional blueprints - through which related cases can be reinterpreted.

The wider significance of the argument lies in its refusal to separate politics from administration, law from power, or formal settlements from the material and organizational incentives that sustain them. Whether the issue is peace, recognition, state formation, foreign policy, accountability, decentralization, mediation, regional security, diaspora politics, or Chinese engagement, the article shows that durable explanation requires attention to how authority is actually organized and contested. That insight gives the manuscript both scholarly value and policy relevance, and it positions the article strongly for submission to African Peace and Conflict Studies.

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