Al-Shabaab’s persistence in East Africa is often attributed to transnational jihadist ideology, yet its durability also reflects the interaction between governance failure and local grievance. The concept of governing through grievance captures how armed groups mobilise support by embedding themselves within everyday political and economic discontent. Moving beyond a descriptive account, the manuscript situates violent extremism within the political economy of state fragility, examining how local grievances and transnational ideological projects intersect in shaping insurgent resilience across East Africa. Focusing on Somalia, with regional extension into Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, the study addresses three interrelated questions: the extent to which Al-Shabaab’s recruitment is driven by ideological commitment versus grievances rooted in clan marginalisation, state predation, economic exclusion, and livelihood collapse; how the group’s governance practices—including taxation, dispute resolution, and provision of basic services—have enabled it to sustain a social base in southern Somalia despite sustained AMISOM/ATMIS military pressure; and what explains its expansion into neighbouring states, whether through ideological diffusion, exploitation of criminal networks, or the replication of local grievance dynamics. Methodologically, the study combines comparative subnational analysis of Al-Shabaab’s territorial control and governance practices (drawing on ACLED and Mapping Militant Organizations data), interviews with former members, community leaders, and security officials in Somalia and Kenya, analysis of Al-Shabaab propaganda and administrative materials, and comparative reference to JNIM in the Sahel. The contribution lies in demonstrating how insurgent governance i