This article develops militarised customary brokerage as an analytical lens for understanding customary authority, legal pluralism, and the wartime remaking of local governance. Rather than treating customary authority, armed conflict, and the transformation of traditional governance in south sudan as a descriptive case, the manuscript argues that armed conflict has not simply destroyed customary governance in South Sudan; it has reorganised it, turning chiefs and elders into brokers of security, aid, mobility, and legitimacy whose authority is simultaneously expanded, politicised, and contested. Anchored in Legal pluralism (Griffiths; Merry); customary authority in African politics (Mamdani; Englebert; Tignor); transitional justice and traditional justice (Huyse & Salter). Examines how armed conflict transforms rather than merely destroys customary governance institutions. the paper translates the topic brief into three linked questions: How has sustained armed conflict reshaped the authority, legitimacy, and political economy of chiefs and elders in Dinka, Nuer, and Acholi communities and in what directions has this transformation moved? Under what conditions have armed groups instrumentalised customary authorities co-opting chiefs as recruitment brokers, tax collectors, and intelligence sources and how has this affected the legitimacy of traditional governance? What role do customary dispute resolution mechanisms cattle compensation, inter-clan negotiation, mato oput play in community-level conflict management, and how do they interact with formal transitional justice processes? Methodologically, it is organised around Multi-site ethnographic fieldwork in Bor, Rumbek, Torit, and Yambio; interviews with chiefs, women's groups, youth leaders, and returned IDPs; archiva