This paper examines the paradox of South Sudan’s sovereign recognition persisting despite a profound deficit in domestic territorial consolidation and state capacity from 2021 to 2026. It aims to analyse how international recognition functions as a substitute for, rather than a catalyst of, effective statehood, thereby insulating governing elites from conventional pressures for institutional reform. The research employs a qualitative case study methodology, drawing on elite interviews conducted in Juba in 2024, documentary analysis of peace agreement implementation reports, and longitudinal tracking of fiscal governance and security sector expenditures over the five-year period. The findings reveal that the unqualified maintenance of international legitimacy has enabled a form of symbolic statecraft, where approximately 60% of the national budget remains allocated to coercive apparatuses while basic service delivery collapses, directly undermining the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement. The study’s novel contribution is its theorisation of ‘sovereignty-as-resource’, a mechanism through which recognition is leveraged to secure external financing and political cover, perpetuating a cycle of weak institutionalisation. This demonstrates that in weak state contexts, the international community’s commitment to the norm of sovereign equality can inadvertently entrench predatory governance, with direct implications for peacebuilding and state-building policy frameworks in Africa.