Social protection has become a central policy instrument for reducing vulnerability, protecting household consumption and strengthening human capital in low-income and fragile settings. In South Sudan, however, the financing of social protection is shaped by a difficult fiscal contradiction. The country has a resource base built around oil, yet the same resource base is exposed to production disruption, price shocks, transit constraints, arrears, weak non-oil taxation and fragile budget execution. This article investigates how oil revenue, donor aid and fiscal commitment interact in financing social protection in South Sudan. The Study used a qualitative political economy and fiscal analysis design, supported by document review of government budget records, World Bank implementation reports, humanitarian planning documents, and recent literature on social protection finance. The analysis found that South Sudan’s social protection financing problem is not only a shortage of money but also a problem of revenue instability, donor dependence, limited domestic budget commitment and weak delivery-system institutionalisation. Official budget and development-partner records show that oil continues to dominate the fiscal base, while social protection programmes remain heavily dependent on externally financed projects and humanitarian aid. The article argues that South Sudan requires a protected social protection financing compact that links oil-revenue rules, non-oil revenue mobilisation, donor co-financing, delivery-system investment and transparent budget execution. The proposed framework does not treat donor aid as a substitute for public commitment; rather, it positions donor finance as a transitional stabiliser while national institutions build a credible fiscal floor for c