This article addresses the persistent reproduction of organised violence in South Sudan despite formal peace agreements, arguing that the post-2021 transitional period constitutes a ‘predatory peace’ sustained by oil-rent distribution. It develops a novel theoretical framework to analyse how elite bargaining over petroleum revenues systematically perpetuates conflict dynamics. The methodology employs a longitudinal case study design, analysing primary data from elite interviews and government budgets alongside secondary sources on conflict events and oil production from 2005 to 2022. The analysis reveals that approximately 85% of national oil revenue is allocated through opaque, off-budget channels controlled by the presidency, directly financing parallel security structures and militias, thereby incentivising elite collusion to maintain a violent status quo. This framework contributes to African political economy by elucidating the specific mechanism through which resource rents are converted into political violence within neopatrimonial systems. The principal theoretical implication is that peacebuilding models must account for the deliberate institutionalisation of violence as a mode of elite revenue management, fundamentally challenging conventional power-sharing prescriptions.