This working paper analyses the paradoxical endurance of organised violence in South Sudan following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, arguing that the country’s trajectory constitutes a ‘predatory peace’—a stable system in which elite bargaining over oil rents systematically reproduces organised violence as a core mode of governance. It aims to elucidate the specific mechanisms through which petroleum revenues sustain this violent political order from 2005 to 2025. Employing a qualitative case study design and critical political economy framework, the research utilises process-tracing of documentary evidence—including government audits, peace agreements, and international reports—complemented by systematic conflict event data. The analysis reveals that oil revenues have fuelled a political marketplace where violence is a primary currency, with major national conflicts and persistent localised violence correlating directly with bargaining failures over resource allocation. The paper’s central contribution is to demonstrate how internationally backed power-sharing agreements and oil wealth have become integral components of a violent system, formalising elite access to rents without dismantling militarised patronage networks. Consequently, the findings challenge conventional post-conflict statebuilding models, showing that technical interventions focused on revenue management or ceasefire monitoring are inadequate for addressing the economic rationality of violence embedded within South Sudan’s predatory peace.