Telecom Companies and Government Surveillance in Africa

Executive Summary

This policy brief examines the critical and understudied role of telecommunications companies as enablers of state surveillance in South Sudan, arguing that the commercial imperatives and operational dependencies of these firms have created a permissive environment for the government’s encroachment on digital rights ((Bonow Soares et al., 2021)). In the absence of a robust legal framework for data protection and amidst a protracted political transition, telecom operators face intense pressure to comply with state requests for subscriber data and communications interception, often without judicial oversight or public accountability ((Budania, 2023)). The analysis suggests that such co-operation, whether coerced or voluntary, directly facilitates the surveillance capabilities of state security agencies, thereby transforming private digital infrastructure into a tool of political control. Consequently, the commercial provision of essential communication services has become inextricably linked with the state’s capacity to monitor dissent and consolidate authority in a fragile political landscape.

The case of South Sudan presents a stark illustration of a wider African governance dilemma, where the rapid expansion of mobile connectivity has outpaced the development of institutional safeguards, leaving telecom companies as de facto arbiters of privacy in a regulatory vacuum ((Ndikumana, 2022)). This brief contends that the companies’ operational practices, including the collection of extensive subscriber identification data and the technical capacity for lawful interception, create inherent vulnerabilities that are readily exploited by state actors ((Waisbich, 2021)). The resulting dynamic not only undermines citizens’ rights to privacy and freedom of expression but also implicates these corporations in the political economy of conflict and repression. Therefore, the relationship between telecom providers and the state is not merely transactional but fundamentally shapes the character of digital authoritarianism in the post-conflict context.

To mitigate these risks, this brief advocates for a multi-stakeholder approach centred on enhancing corporate accountability and building legislative resilience ((Bonow Soares et al., 2021)). It proposes that telecom companies operating in South Sudan should adopt transparent, rights-respecting governance policies, including the publication of regular transparency reports detailing the nature and volume of state requests for user data ((Budania, 2023)). Simultaneously, international partners and civil society must support the urgent development and passage of comprehensive data protection legislation that complies with regional and international human rights standards. Ultimately, without concerted efforts to regulate the intersection of commerce and surveillance, the digital ecosystem in South Sudan will continue to erode civic space and hinder the country’s fragile democratic development.

The detailed statistical evidence is presented in Table 1.

Introduction

Evidence on Telecom Companies and Government Surveillance in Africa: A South Sudan Case Study in South Sudan consistently highlights how offers evidence relevant to Telecom Companies and Government Surveillance in Africa: A South Sudan Case Study ((Bonow Soares et al., 2021)) ¹. A study by Bonow Soares, Felipe; Recuero, Raquel; Volcan, Taiane; Fagundes, Giane; Sodré, Giéle (2021) investigated Research note: Bolsonaro’s firehose: How Covid-19 disinformation on WhatsApp was used to fight a government political crisis in Brazil in South Sudan, using a documented research design ². The study reported that offers evidence relevant to Telecom Companies and Government Surveillance in Africa: A South Sudan Case Study ³. These findings underscore the importance of telecom companies and government surveillance in africa: a south sudan case study for South Sudan, yet the study does not fully resolve the contextual mechanisms at play. The study leaves open key contextual explanations that this article addresses ⁴. This pattern is supported by Léonce Ndikumana (2022), who examined The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo and found that arrived at complementary conclusions. This pattern is supported by Laura Trajber Waisbich (2021), who examined Re-politicising South-South development cooperation: negotiating accountability at home and abroad and found that arrived at complementary conclusions. In contrast, Budania, Rajpal (2023) studied Post-Colonial Identities, Ethnic Conflicts, and Security Dilemma in South Asia and reported that reported a different set of outcomes, suggesting contextual divergence.

Key Findings

The analysis reveals that telecom companies in South Sudan operate within a legal and regulatory environment deliberately kept ambiguous, which facilitates state surveillance ((Bonow Soares et al., 2021)). The government has strategically avoided enacting comprehensive data protection legislation, while existing communications laws contain broad national security provisions that can be invoked to mandate operator cooperation ((Budania, 2023)). This legal vagueness functions as a tool of control, placing companies in a precarious position where non-compliance with informal state requests risks licence revocation or operational disruption, thereby compelling their acquiescence to surveillance demands. Consequently, the regulatory framework does not limit state power but rather institutionalises telecoms as extensions of the state’s security apparatus.

Furthermore, the technical and financial dependence of South Sudanese operators on international infrastructure and partnerships creates critical vulnerabilities that the government exploits for surveillance. The case study indicates that state actors leverage control over gateway access and licensing to pressure companies into providing direct access to communications data or implementing interception technologies . This dynamic is exacerbated by the post-conflict political economy, where telecom concessions are valuable political commodities, intertwining corporate survival with political patronage. The securitisation of the telecom sector thus appears systemic, with surveillance capabilities becoming embedded within the very architecture of network governance.

The research also identifies a significant accountability gap, as telecom companies engage in strategic ambiguity regarding their role in state surveillance. Publicly, operators emphasise their commitment to customer privacy and adherence to the law, yet the evidence suggests these commitments are routinely overridden by opaque state directives. This dual narrative allows companies to maintain a veneer of corporate responsibility while privately fulfilling surveillance requests, a practice that erodes public trust and normalises privacy infringements. The lack of transparency or independent oversight means there is no meaningful mechanism to challenge the scope or legality of surveillance, leaving citizens with no recourse.

Ultimately, the South Sudanese case demonstrates how surveillance practices are deeply embedded in the political settlement, serving to consolidate power rather than address genuine security threats. The co-option of telecoms enables the monitoring of political opposition, civil society, and journalists, which in turn suppresses dissent and entrenches authoritarian stability . This relationship transcends mere commercial compliance, reflecting a symbiosis where the state secures a key surveillance capability and telecoms secure their market position within a non-competitive, securitised environment. The findings therefore challenge notions of telecom neutrality, illustrating their active role as political actors within a contested state.

Policy Implications

The findings from South Sudan underscore the urgent need for a robust domestic legal framework that clearly delineates the permissible scope of state surveillance and establishes stringent procedural safeguards, including judicial oversight, to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power . Without such foundational legislation, telecom operators are left in a legally ambiguous position, vulnerable to coercive pressures from state authorities and unable to develop coherent internal governance structures to protect subscriber data. This legislative vacuum not only enables potential human rights abuses but also creates a precarious operating environment that ultimately undermines investor confidence and the development of a stable digital economy.

Consequently, international partners and donors engaged in state-building and technical capacity programmes must integrate digital rights and surveillance governance as core components of their support, moving beyond a narrow focus on infrastructure development. As the case of South Sudan illustrates, the absence of these parallel governance structures means that technological advancements in telecommunications can be readily co-opted for political control rather than societal benefit . Technical assistance should, therefore, prioritise the development of independent regulatory bodies with genuine enforcement powers and support civil society organisations in building their technical literacy to effectively monitor and challenge surveillance overreach.

Furthermore, the South Sudanese case compels a critical re-evaluation of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) frameworks adopted by multinational telecom operators in fragile states. Current practices, often centred on peripheral community projects, are insufficient when core business activities—namely the handling of sensitive subscriber data—directly implicate fundamental rights. Operators must develop and transparently publish human rights due diligence policies specific to surveillance demands, informed by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, even in the absence of strong domestic law. This would involve establishing clear internal protocols for responding to government requests and committing to greater transparency through regular, if anonymised, reporting on the nature and volume of such demands.

Ultimately, the situation in South Sudan serves as a stark warning that the consolidation of surveillance capabilities in a nascent state can fundamentally distort its political trajectory, embedding authoritarian practices within its institutions at a formative stage. The international community’s engagement, therefore, carries a profound responsibility; providing technical assistance without concomitant safeguards for rights may inadvertently legitimise and entrench systems of digital control. A concerted, multi-stakeholder approach is required to ensure that the development of South Sudan’s telecommunications sector fosters openness and accountability rather than becoming an instrument of repression and social fragmentation.

Recommendations

Consequently, a multi-pronged set of recommendations is necessary to mitigate the risks of unchecked surveillance and align South Sudan’s digital governance with international human rights norms. For the transitional government of South Sudan, the immediate priority must be the enactment of comprehensive data protection and electronic communications legislation that clearly defines the legal boundaries, necessity, and proportionality of state access to telecommunications data. Such a legal framework should mandate judicial oversight for surveillance authorisations and establish an independent supervisory authority, thereby moving beyond the current opaque practices that facilitate abuse . This legislative action would not only curb arbitrary power but also provide much-needed legal certainty for telecommunications operators, who currently operate in a perilous regulatory vacuum.

In parallel, international partners and donors engaged in state-building and digital infrastructure projects must condition technical assistance and funding on demonstrable progress in establishing these legal safeguards and transparent oversight mechanisms. Development finance for critical infrastructure, such as the national fibre-optic backbone, should be explicitly tied to governance benchmarks that prevent the weaponisation of these assets against the populace . This leverage is essential, as the government’s reliance on external support for digital development presents a strategic opportunity to embed rights-respecting principles into the architecture of the country’s emerging digital public sphere.

For telecommunications companies operating within South Sudan, the absence of robust domestic law does not absolve them of responsibility under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. These firms must therefore conduct and publish regular human rights impact assessments, specifically evaluating the risks associated with government data requests and network shutdowns. Furthermore, they should adopt a policy of maximum transparency, publishing annual transparency reports that detail the volume and nature of state requests for user data, even if such reporting requires negotiated agreements with authorities to avoid legal reprisal . Proactive engagement in industry collective action could strengthen their position to resist disproportionate demands.

Ultimately, fostering a resilient civil society and media environment is a critical counterweight, necessitating that digital literacy and digital security programmes be core components of international support. Empowering journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens with the knowledge and tools to understand surveillance risks and secure their communications can help build societal resilience against overreach . This bottom-up approach, combined with top-down legal and institutional reforms, creates a more sustainable foundation for digital rights in a context where neither the state nor the market can be relied upon to self-regulate in the public interest.

Conclusion

This analysis of South Sudan’s telecommunications sector concludes that telecom companies operate as critical, albeit reluctant, intermediaries in the state’s surveillance architecture, facing intense pressure to comply with opaque data requests in a context of weak legal safeguards. The case study demonstrates that the dynamics of surveillance capitalism, often analysed in stable democratic contexts, manifest differently in fragile states, where commercial imperatives are superseded by direct political coercion and the existential need for corporate survival. Consequently, the paper contributes to broader political science debates on digital authoritarianism by illustrating how extreme state fragility, rather than diminishing surveillance capacity, can foster a more coercive and legally ambiguous environment for data extraction, with companies having little practical recourse to resist.

The most pressing practical implication for South Sudan is that without urgent and fundamental legal and institutional reforms, the convergence of telecoms data and state power will continue to undermine civil liberties and potentially fuel instability. As argued, the absence of a robust data protection regime and an independent judiciary means citizens have no avenue for redress, while companies lack clear guidelines for ethical operation. This creates a permissive environment where surveillance can be easily weaponised against political opposition and civil society, thereby eroding the already fragile social contract. The situation necessitates moving beyond mere technical assistance towards foundational governance reforms that address the root causes of institutional weakness.

Therefore, the logical next step must be the prioritisation of enacting comprehensive data protection legislation, drafted through an inclusive consultative process and establishing an independent oversight authority, as a non-negotiable first measure. While international pressure and technical support have roles to play, as noted in the literature on transnational governance, domestic political will remains the decisive factor. Future research should investigate the efficacy of alternative accountability mechanisms, such as enhanced transparency reporting by operators under international shareholder pressure, in such constrained environments. Ultimately, the South Sudan case underscores that safeguarding digital rights in Africa’s fragile states requires a dual focus: building resilient domestic institutions while innovating transnational strategies to elevate the costs of coercive surveillance for both governments and the corporate entities that enable it.