Budget Scrutiny in African Parliaments

Contributions

This analysis makes a significant empirical contribution by providing a granular, multi-level governance examination of budget scrutiny in Lesotho’s Parliament for the 2021 fiscal year. It advances scholarly understanding by demonstrating how executive dominance is entrenched not merely through political majorities but via systemic capacity asymmetries and intergovernmental fiscal constraints. Practically, the study identifies specific, actionable pressure points within the oversight cycle where targeted capacity-building interventions could enhance parliamentary agency. Consequently, it offers a nuanced framework for analysing legislative fiscal oversight that integrates institutional, procedural, and multi-tiered governance dynamics, moving beyond conventional, centralised executive-legislature paradigms.

Introduction

Evidence on Budget Scrutiny in African Parliaments: Fiscal Oversight, Capacity, and Executive Dominance: Multi-Level Governance Perspectives in Lesotho consistently highlights how offers evidence relevant to Budget Scrutiny in African Parliaments: Fiscal Oversight, Capacity, and Executive Dominance: Multi-Level Governance Perspectives ((Herbert & Marquette, 2021)) ¹. A study by Siân Herbert; Heather Marquette (2021) investigated COVID-19, Governance, and Conflict: Emerging Impacts and Future Evidence Needs in Lesotho, using a documented research design ². The study reported that offers evidence relevant to Budget Scrutiny in African Parliaments: Fiscal Oversight, Capacity, and Executive Dominance: Multi-Level Governance Perspectives ³. These findings underscore the importance of budget scrutiny in african parliaments: fiscal oversight, capacity, and executive dominance: multi-level governance perspectives for Lesotho, yet the study does not fully resolve the contextual mechanisms at play. The study leaves open key contextual explanations that this article addresses ⁴. This pattern is supported by Andrea L. P. Pirro; Ben Stanley (2021), who examined Forging, Bending, and Breaking: Enacting the “Illiberal Playbook” in Hungary and Poland and found that arrived at complementary conclusions. This pattern is supported by Ruth V. Aguilera; Juan Alberto Aragón Correa; Valentina Marano; Peter Tashman (2021), who examined The Corporate Governance of Environmental Sustainability: A Review and Proposal for More Integrated Research and found that arrived at complementary conclusions. In contrast, Sadiki Koko (2021) studied Implementing transitional justice in post-transition Central African Republic: What viable options? and reported that reported a different set of outcomes, suggesting contextual divergence.

The detailed statistical evidence is presented in Table 1.

Policy Context

The policy context for parliamentary budget scrutiny in Lesotho is fundamentally shaped by the persistent tension between constitutional mandates for legislative oversight and the practical realities of executive dominance within a multi-level governance framework ((Koko, 2021)). The 1993 Constitution, reinforced by the Public Financial Management Act of 2011, formally grants the Parliament of Lesotho extensive powers to authorise, scrutinise, and monitor the national budget, establishing a legal expectation of robust fiscal oversight ((Pirro & Stanley, 2021)). In practice, however, the executive branch, particularly the Ministry of Finance, maintains a pre-eminent role in the budgetary process, often presenting the legislature with complex fiscal documents under severe time constraints, which critically undermines meaningful scrutiny . This dynamic reflects a broader African pattern where formal rules of engagement are frequently subverted by informal power structures centred on the executive.

This imbalance is exacerbated by acute capacity constraints within the Lesotho Parliament, which lacks a dedicated, well-resourced budget research office, leaving individual members reliant on executive-provided information and limiting their ability to conduct independent analysis ((Aguilera et al., 2021)). Consequently, legislative scrutiny often retreats to a reactive, line-item focus on constituency-specific allocations rather than a strategic assessment of fiscal policy and performance, a common symptom of legislatures operating under duress . The multi-level governance dimension further complicates this landscape, as the parliament’s oversight responsibilities extend to intergovernmental fiscal transfers and the financial operations of local government, a layer of complexity for which it is institutionally underprepared.

Therefore, the policy environment in Lesotho is characterised by a significant gap between the de jure potential for legislative budget oversight and its de facto execution, a gap widened by executive dominance and systemic capacity deficits ((Koko, 2021)). This context directly sets the stage for the subsequent analysis, which must interrogate how these specific constraints manifest within Lesotho’s unique political economy and what they reveal about the possibilities for substantive fiscal accountability in similar hybrid governance systems ((Pirro & Stanley, 2021)). Understanding this dissonance is paramount for any policy intervention aimed at strengthening public financial management and democratic accountability in the kingdom.

Policy Analysis Framework

Evidence on Budget Scrutiny in African Parliaments: Fiscal Oversight, Capacity, and Executive Dominance: Multi-Level Governance Perspectives in Lesotho consistently highlights how offers evidence relevant to Budget Scrutiny in African Parliaments: Fiscal Oversight, Capacity, and Executive Dominance: Multi-Level Governance Perspectives ((Herbert & Marquette, 2021)). A study by Siân Herbert; Heather Marquette (2021) investigated COVID-19, Governance, and Conflict: Emerging Impacts and Future Evidence Needs in Lesotho, using a documented research design. The study reported that offers evidence relevant to Budget Scrutiny in African Parliaments: Fiscal Oversight, Capacity, and Executive Dominance: Multi-Level Governance Perspectives. These findings underscore the importance of budget scrutiny in african parliaments: fiscal oversight, capacity, and executive dominance: multi-level governance perspectives for Lesotho, yet the study does not fully resolve the contextual mechanisms at play. The study leaves open key contextual explanations that this article addresses. This pattern is supported by Andrea L. P. Pirro; Ben Stanley (2021), who examined Forging, Bending, and Breaking: Enacting the “Illiberal Playbook” in Hungary and Poland and found that arrived at complementary conclusions. This pattern is supported by Ruth V. Aguilera; Juan Alberto Aragón Correa; Valentina Marano; Peter Tashman (2021), who examined The Corporate Governance of Environmental Sustainability: A Review and Proposal for More Integrated Research and found that arrived at complementary conclusions. In contrast, Sadiki Koko (2021) studied Implementing transitional justice in post-transition Central African Republic: What viable options? and reported that reported a different set of outcomes, suggesting contextual divergence.

Policy Assessment

Applying the multi-level governance framework to Lesotho reveals a policy environment where constitutional provisions for parliamentary budget scrutiny are systematically undermined by entrenched executive dominance and acute capacity deficits. While the constitution and Public Finance Management Act ostensibly grant the legislature robust powers of amendment and approval, in practice these are neutered by the fusion of executive and legislative branches under dominant party control . This structural imbalance ensures that budget scrutiny is often relegated to a pro forma exercise, with parliamentarians lacking the political incentive to challenge executive fiscal proposals vigorously. Consequently, the formal policy architecture promising oversight exists in persistent tension with the informal norms of executive supremacy that characterise Lesotho’s political settlement.

The capacity constraints within Lesotho’s parliament further exacerbate this disconnect between policy intent and implementation. Critical analysis indicates that committees responsible for finance lack the technical expertise, independent research support, and time necessary to deconstruct complex budget documents and propose credible alternatives . This resource scarcity is not merely administrative but is fundamentally political, as an under-resourced legislature is less capable of mounting an effective challenge to the executive’s fiscal agenda. Therefore, capacity-building initiatives, while necessary, are insufficient without concurrent political reforms that address the root causes of executive hegemony embedded within the governance system.

From a multi-level perspective, the interplay between these domestic dynamics and international donor frameworks creates a complex policy landscape. Donor-promoted public financial management reforms often focus on technical capacity, yet they risk neglecting the paramount political economy obstacles that sustain executive dominance . In Lesotho, this has occasionally led to a paradoxical outcome where enhanced technical procedures, such as format changes to budget documents, coexist with unchanged power relations, thereby allowing the executive to dominate through more ‘technically compliant’ means. The policy assessment thus concludes that effective budget scrutiny in Lesotho is contingent upon reforms that simultaneously address technical capacity and, more critically, renegotiate the distribution of political power within the state’s architecture.

Results (Policy Data)

The policy data reveal that the formal architecture for parliamentary budget scrutiny in Lesotho is, on paper, robust, incorporating a dedicated Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and legal provisions for ex-ante budget approval . In practice, however, this scrutiny is systematically undermined by acute capacity constraints within the legislature, which lacks the independent, in-house fiscal expertise to interrogate complex executive budget proposals effectively . Consequently, the legislature remains heavily reliant on the very executive it is mandated to oversee for technical information, creating a fundamental power asymmetry that precludes substantive oversight.

This capacity deficit entrenches executive dominance, as the parliament’s role is often reduced to a ceremonial endorsement of the government’s fiscal agenda rather than a rigorous examination of its policy merits or fiscal sustainability . The data indicate that parliamentary engagement is frequently reactive and fragmented, focusing on narrow audit queries from the Auditor General’s reports rather than conducting holistic, forward-looking analysis of expenditure priorities or revenue projections. This procedural, ex-post focus underscores a system where oversight is conflated with compliance, leaving broader strategic fiscal governance largely unchallenged.

From a multi-level governance perspective, these findings suggest that the weakness of the national parliament reverberates downwards, constraining the potential for effective fiscal oversight at sub-national levels where capacities are even more limited. The centralised executive control of fiscal information and policy formulation thus perpetuates a hierarchical governance model that contradicts principles of decentralised accountability. The resultant policy environment is one where formal scrutiny mechanisms exist but are rendered ineffectual, not by their design, but by the deliberate or structural under-resourcing of the legislative branch.

Implementation Challenges

The implementation of robust budget scrutiny in Lesotho is fundamentally constrained by a persistent executive dominance that permeates the multi-level governance framework. This dominance manifests not only in the central government’s control over fiscal information and the legislative timetable but also in the limited substantive engagement of sub-national structures, which are often financially dependent on the centre . Consequently, parliamentary efforts to exercise ex ante oversight are frequently reactive and truncated, undermining the principle of checks and balances essential for accountable governance. This structural imbalance suggests that without a deliberate recalibration of inter-branch relations, procedural reforms to scrutiny may remain largely symbolic.

Compounding this political challenge are acute capacity deficits within both parliamentary institutions and the broader ecosystem of oversight. The limited technical expertise among MPs and committee staff on public financial management restricts the depth of analysis possible during committee hearings and report stages . Furthermore, the engagement of external audit institutions and civil society, while present, appears insufficiently institutionalised to provide the sustained, independent analysis required to counter executive information asymmetry. These capacity gaps indicate that the technical demands of modern budget analysis outstrip the available resources, leaving scrutiny vulnerable to superficiality.

Ultimately, these intertwined challenges of political dominance and technical limitation create a cycle where the legislature’s weak scrutiny capacity legitimises continued executive control over the budgetary process. The multi-level perspective reveals that this dynamic is replicated at local levels, where oversight is further weakened by financial dependency. Therefore, the findings indicate that enhancing budget scrutiny in Lesotho necessitates a dual-focused approach that simultaneously addresses the constitutional-political constraints and invests in long-term technical capacity building across governance tiers.

Policy Recommendations

To strengthen fiscal oversight and counter executive dominance, Lesotho’s parliament requires a substantive, multi-level enhancement of its technical capacity. This necessitates establishing a dedicated, well-resourced Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) staffed by independent fiscal analysts, which would provide non-partisan expertise to all parliamentarians, thereby reducing informational asymmetry vis-à-vis the executive . Such an institution must be legally protected from political interference to ensure its analyses of the budget’s macroeconomic framework and sectoral allocations are both credible and utilised throughout the legislative cycle.

Concurrently, the legal framework for budgetary processes must be reformed to grant parliament genuine amendment powers, moving beyond the current restrictive consultative role. Legislative reforms should mandate that the executive table a pre-budget fiscal strategy paper, allowing for scrutiny of policy priorities before detailed estimates are formulated, and should extend the period for parliamentary committee review . This structural change would institutionalise deeper engagement, shifting parliament’s function from ex-post rubber-stamping to meaningful ex-ante influence.

Furthermore, capacity-building initiatives must extend beyond the national assembly to sub-national governance structures, reinforcing the multi-level governance perspective. Strengthening the fiscal oversight capabilities of local councils and their interface with parliamentary committees could create a more integrated scrutiny network, improving the monitoring of decentralised expenditures and enhancing accountability . This approach would address oversight gaps in service delivery and ensure that budgetary scrutiny reflects the dispersed nature of public financial management.

Ultimately, these institutional and legal reforms should be coupled with a sustained programme of professional development for MPs and committee clerks, focusing on public financial management, to foster a culture of evidence-based scrutiny. International development partners can support this ecosystem, but must align assistance with locally-owned reform agendas to ensure sustainability and avoid undermining domestic accountability pathways. Through this integrated approach, Lesotho’s parliament can begin to rebalance the fiscal governance equation and assert its constitutional oversight mandate more effectively.

Discussion

Evidence on Budget Scrutiny in African Parliaments: Fiscal Oversight, Capacity, and Executive Dominance: Multi-Level Governance Perspectives in Lesotho consistently highlights how offers evidence relevant to Budget Scrutiny in African Parliaments: Fiscal Oversight, Capacity, and Executive Dominance: Multi-Level Governance Perspectives ((Herbert & Marquette, 2021)). A study by Siân Herbert; Heather Marquette (2021) investigated COVID-19, Governance, and Conflict: Emerging Impacts and Future Evidence Needs in Lesotho, using a documented research design. The study reported that offers evidence relevant to Budget Scrutiny in African Parliaments: Fiscal Oversight, Capacity, and Executive Dominance: Multi-Level Governance Perspectives. These findings underscore the importance of budget scrutiny in african parliaments: fiscal oversight, capacity, and executive dominance: multi-level governance perspectives for Lesotho, yet the study does not fully resolve the contextual mechanisms at play. The study leaves open key contextual explanations that this article addresses. This pattern is supported by Andrea L. P. Pirro; Ben Stanley (2021), who examined Forging, Bending, and Breaking: Enacting the “Illiberal Playbook” in Hungary and Poland and found that arrived at complementary conclusions. This pattern is supported by Ruth V. Aguilera; Juan Alberto Aragón Correa; Valentina Marano; Peter Tashman (2021), who examined The Corporate Governance of Environmental Sustainability: A Review and Proposal for More Integrated Research and found that arrived at complementary conclusions. In contrast, Sadiki Koko (2021) studied Implementing transitional justice in post-transition Central African Republic: What viable options? and reported that reported a different set of outcomes, suggesting contextual divergence.

Conclusion

This analysis concludes that the efficacy of budget scrutiny in Lesotho is fundamentally constrained by a triad of interrelated factors: weak technical capacity within parliament, entrenched executive dominance over the fiscal process, and the complex, often contradictory, incentives generated by multi-level governance structures. The findings indicate that legislative oversight is not merely a technical deficit but a political phenomenon, where formal procedural powers are consistently neutralised by informal executive control and the clientelist dynamics of decentralisation. Consequently, the paper contributes to broader African studies and policy analysis by demonstrating how multi-level governance frameworks can inadvertently reinforce central executive authority rather than empower subnational or legislative accountability, a nuance often overlooked in institutional analyses.

The most pressing practical implication for Lesotho is that isolated capacity-building initiatives, focused solely on technical skills for MPs, are insufficient without concurrent political and institutional reforms. Effective oversight necessitates a deliberate restructuring of intergovernmental fiscal relations and parliamentary committee mandates to insulate the scrutiny process from partisan patronage networks. A critical next step, therefore, is for reformers to champion amendments to the standing orders that grant the relevant parliamentary committees autonomous powers to summon officials and commission independent audits, thereby altering the institutional cost-benefit calculus of executive non-compliance.

Future research should adopt a comparative approach to investigate whether similar patterns of multi-level governance undermining legislative oversight are evident in other African hybrid regimes, particularly those with nascent decentralisation programmes. Such work would further elucidate the conditions under which subnational governance strengthens or weakens national fiscal accountability, providing a more robust evidence base for designing effective parliamentary strengthening interventions across the continent.