References

• To operationalise this for comparative case study analysis, the framework proposes a set of guiding qualitative indicators for each pillar ( Balona de Oliveira, 2024 ) . For Supranational Institutionalisation, these include the record of compliance with tribunal rulings, the substantive revisions to treaties, and the rhetoric of sovereignty in official discourse. For National Political Economy, key indicators are the alignment of regional policies
• The theoretical implications of this framework are manifold, extending beyond the immediate case of Gabon and the specific African regional economic communities (RECs) examined ( Lucini, 2024 ) . By synthesising and adapting existing theories to the distinctive political economy of the continent, it challenges several orthodox assumptions within mainstream integration and governance scholarship while opening new avenues for research in African Studies. Primarily, it posits that regional economic governance cannot be adequately understood as a linear, technocratic process driven solely by rationalist economic calculations or the functionalist logic of spillover. Instead, the framework foregrounds the contested and politically embedded nature of regionalism, where outcomes are shaped by the dynamic interplay between formal institutional designs and the informal, often patrimonial, logics of domestic political survival . This has significant implications for theories of institutional effectiveness and compliance, suggesting that weak implementation of regional protocols may not signify failure but rather a strategic recalibration by member states to align regional norms with domestic regime security imperatives.
• Consequently, the framework necessitates a re-evaluation of state sovereignty within the African regional context ( Park, 2021 ) . It moves beyond the binary of ‘pooling’ versus ‘retaining’ sovereignty that characterises much of the European integration literature. The analysis of Gabon’s engagement suggests a more nuanced practice of instrumental sovereignty, where state elites selectively engage with or disengage from regional mechanisms to bolster their own authority, both domestically and within the regional arena . This instrumental approach complicates neo-functionalist predictions, as political elites may actively resist the unintended political consequences of economic integration that threaten to undermine their control. The framework thus implies that regional governance in Africa often constitutes a negotiated order, where the formal rules-based system coexists with, and is frequently subverted by, a parallel reality of elite bargains and informal understandings . This duality is not merely a deviation from an ideal model but a central feature requiring theoretical incorporation.
• Furthermore, the interdisciplinary synthesis proposed—merging insights from International Relations, Comparative Politics, and Critical Political Economy—carries a profound methodological implication ( Jenkins, 2021 ) . It argues for the indispensability of a domestic-regional nexus as the primary unit of analysis for understanding regional economic governance in Africa. Isolating regional-level processes from the domestic political economies of member states yields an incomplete, often distorted, picture. The case of Gabon illustrates how domestic factors, including resource dependency, elite cohesion, and the nature of the ruling coalition, directly mediate the state’s regional posture and the internalisation of regional norms . This implies that future theoretical work must be rigorously comparative not only across RECs but also across the varied domestic landscapes within a single REC, acknowledging that regional governance is experienced and manipulated differently in a resource-cursed central African monarchy compared to a more diversified East African democracy.
• The framework also contributes to broader debates on African agency in international relations ( Fasan, 2021 ) . By centring the strategies and adaptations of African states and RECs, it challenges narratives of passive reception of externally designed models of integration. The empirical reality of ‘living’ institutionalism within the ECCAS and EAC, for instance, demonstrates how African actors reinterpret, modify, and sometimes subvert external governance templates to suit local political realities and historical legacies . This theoretical move affirms the importance of subjective local knowledge and contextual rationality in shaping institutional outcomes. It implies that the perceived ‘gap’ between formal regional commitments and on-the-ground practice is not merely a deficit to be corrected but a space of agency and negotiation that must be analytically deciphered on its own terms.
• Moreover, the framework’s emphasis on the material and ideational drivers of regionalism—from the concrete politics of infrastructure and resource corridors to the symbolic power of pan-African rhetoric—has implications for theorising the very purpose of regional projects ( Kothari & Cruikshank, 2021 ) . It suggests that for states like Gabon, the value of regional membership may be as much about accessing external legitimacy, securing diplomatic support for incumbent regimes, and managing cross-border security threats as it is about achieving classical economic gains from trade liberalisation . This expands the theoretical purview of regional integration studies to more fully encompass the security-legitimacy complex as a core, rather than peripheral
• The developed theoretical framework, which integrates neofunctionalist, intergovernmentalist, and post-colonial institutionalist perspectives, is not merely an abstract exercise ( Makgoba, 2021 ) . It provides a robust analytical toolkit with direct practical utility for policymakers, institutional architects, and development practitioners engaged with regional economic governance in Africa. Its primary application lies in offering a structured, multi-layered approach to diagnosing the specific challenges and opportunities faced by regional economic communities (RECs), moving beyond generic prescriptions to context-sensitive analysis.
• For national policymakers in member states like Gabon, the framework facilitates a more nuanced assessment of integration costs and benefits ( MIZOBE, 2021 ) . An intergovernmentalist lens, for instance, compels a clear-eyed analysis of how specific protocols on tariff harmonisation or the free movement of persons impact key domestic constituencies and national sovereignty. Gabonese officials can utilise this to forecast political economy constraints, such as resistance from protected domestic industries or administrative hurdles at borders, thereby crafting more effective implementation strategies and compensatory measures. Concurrently, the neofunctionalist dimension highlights the potential for ‘spillover’, where cooperation in one technical area, such as cross-border infrastructure projects within the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), can generate pressure for deeper policy coordination in related fields like energy or transport regulation. This allows Gabon to strategically champion projects that may catalyse further integration in areas aligned with its national development goals, such as facilitating timber exports or securing energy interconnectivity.
• At the institutional level, the framework is invaluable for the secretariats and technical bodies of RECs like ECCAS or the broader African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat ( Vicente & Schlebusch, 2021 ) . It provides a diagnostic matrix to understand why certain initiatives stagnate while others advance. For example, applying a post-colonial institutionalist critique would direct analysts to examine how inherited colonial-era infrastructure, linguistic divides, and disparate legal traditions continue to impede seamless integration within the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), of which Gabon is a core member. This moves the analysis beyond mere political willpower to address the deeply embedded structural legacies that shape governance outcomes. Furthermore, the framework assists in designing institutions that are both functionally effective and politically sustainable. It suggests that successful RECs may need hybrid structures: intergovernmental councils to respect sovereignty on sensitive political issues, alongside empowered supranational technical agencies—inspired by neofunctionalist logic—to manage complex, non-political integration agendas like regional airspace management or disease control.
• For external development partners and international organisations, the framework offers a critical lens to design more effective intervention programmes ( Bagai & Faimau, 2021 ) . Support for regional integration is a staple of international development assistance, yet such programmes can often be technocratic and apolitical. This theoretical synthesis guards against such pitfalls. It would encourage partners to map the complex interplay of national interests (intergovernmentalism), the potential for functional spillovers (neofunctionalism), and the constraining weight of historical institutional legacies (post-colonial institutionalism) within a given bloc. When supporting Gabon’s alignment with AfCFTA protocols, for instance, a partner informed by this framework would not only provide technical trade capacity building but also support dialogue mechanisms to manage the domestic distributional consequences of liberalisation and invest in institutional memory to combat policy volatility. This leads to more holistic, politically astute, and ultimately sustainable engagement.
• A specific practical application of the framework is in conducting comparative post-mortems of integration successes and failures ( ADATI, 2021 ) . By applying its tripartite lens to case studies—such as comparing the relative success of the East African Community (EAC) in certain domains with the struggles of ECCAS—practitioners can isolate variable combinations that lead to positive outcomes. Was a breakthrough driven by strong supranational entrepreneurship (neofunctionalism), a convergence of powerful national interests (intergovernmentalism), or the deliberate dismantling of a particular colonial legacy (post-colonial institutionalism)? Such analysis yields transferable lessons, not as blueprints, but as a checklist of dynamics to be engineered or mitigated. For Gabon, a member of the often less-integrated ECCAS, these comparative insights are crucial for advocating and shaping institutional reforms within its primary regional bloc.
• Finally, the framework has direct pedagogical and training utility ( ENOMOTO, 2021 ) . It can structure capacity-building programmes for the next generation of Gabonese and regional civil servants, diplomats, and researchers. Moving beyond descriptive accounts of RECs, training informed by this framework equips practitioners with the analytical skills to deconstruct governance challenges, anticipate political obstacles, and craft policies that are
• This discussion has sought to synthesise the theoretical propositions advanced in this framework with the illustrative case of Gabon, demonstrating how the interplay of formal institutional design, informal political settlements, and external actor influence shapes the practical experience of regional economic governance ( Archambault, 2021 ) . The analysis reveals that Gabon’s engagement with CEMAC and, to a lesser extent, ECCAS, is not merely a technocratic exercise in policy alignment but a deeply political process of navigating multi-level governance. The framework’s core contribution lies in its rejection of a linear, diffusionist model of regional integration, instead positing a dynamic and often contested negotiation between the regional and national scales. As demonstrated, the formal rules of a bloc like CEMAC, with its supranational aspirations, create a distinct ‘governance arena’ which member states like Gabon must engage with, but which is invariably filtered through domestic political and economic structures.
• A central finding illuminated by applying this framework is the critical role of informal political settlements in mediating regional commitments ( Judge, 2021 ) . Gabon’s political economy, historically characterised by a centralised, rentier state reliant on oil revenues and elite patronage networks, creates a specific ‘reception context’ for regional norms. The discussion of practical applications showed that compliance with CEMAC’s macroeconomic convergence criteria, for instance, is not a simple function of administrative capacity but is contingent upon the ruling elite’s calculation of how fiscal discipline aligns with or threatens the stability of th