Post-conflict recovery is often framed in terms of reconstruction spending and institutional reform, yet long-term transformation depends on deeper shifts in political incentives. In many cases, war economies persist because ruling coalitions continue to benefit from systems of rent extraction, coercion, and exclusion. The concept of a developmental transition bargain captures the conditions under which elites move from preserving rents toward supporting productive accumulation, bureaucratic credibility, and managed forms of competition. Situated within debates on war economies, developmental political economy, and limited access orders, the manuscript examines the political foundations of post-conflict economic transformation. Focusing on South Sudan and Liberia, with comparative reference to Mozambique, Rwanda, and Angola, the study addresses three interrelated questions: what structural changes in political and economic incentives are required to shift post-conflict states away from limited access orders in which violence and exclusion sustain elite rents; what explains variation in post-conflict trajectories, particularly why Mozambique and Rwanda achieved relative economic transformation while Liberia and South Sudan remained locked in extractive equilibria; and how international actors—including donors, international financial institutions, and regional organisations—either reinforce or disrupt war economy dynamics, and under what conditions external engagement can support developmental outcomes. Methodologically, the study combines comparative political economy analysis across five post-conflict cases using economic growth and inequality data, governance indicators (including V-Dem and CPIA), and process tracing of political and institutional change. It is comple